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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE R. BEN ALLY and 
PERLINDA BENALLY, by 
her guardian ad litem, ALICE 
R. BENALLY, 
Plaintiffs- Appellants, Case No. 9677 
v. 
L. G. ROBINSON, CLIFFORD 
G. EDMUNDS and 
LOUIS W. DUN'CAN, 
Defendants - Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the surviving 
wife and daughter to recover damages for the 
wrongful death of their husband and father caused 
by the defendants who are Salt Lake Ci\ty Police 
Officers. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court at the pretrial of the case granted a 
motion for a summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants, Clifford G. Edmunds and Louis W. 
Duncan. As to the defendant, L. G. Robinson, the 
case was tried to a jury. From the summary judg-
lnent that was entered in favor of the defendants, 
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Clifford G. Edmunds and Louis W. Duncan, and 
from a verdict and judgment in favor of the de-
fend~nt, L. G. Robinson, plaintiffs appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the summary judg~ 
ment in favor of the defen·dants, Clifford G. Ed-
munds and Louis W. Duncan, and reversal of the 
judgmen\t in favor of the defendant, L. G. Robinson, 
and that plaintiffs be granted a new trial as to all 
of the defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants are Salt Lake City Police Officers. 
Thomas Dee Benally, the dece·dent, was a Navajo 
Indian and was 22 year~s of age at the time of his 
death. Alice R. Benally is the wife of the decedent 
an·d Perlinda Benally is the minor daughter. 
On November 26, 1960, the defendant, Clif-
ford G. Edmunds, was on duty in the Salt Lake 
City Jail as Chief Jailer. The defendant, Louis W. 
Duncan, was on duty as the Assistant Jailer. On 
the same day the defendant, L. G. Robinson, was on 
duty and was running the patrol wagon which is 
commonly called the "paddy wagon". Robinson has 
been employed as a police officer since 1946. 
On November 26, 1960, Robinson saw Benally 
in downtown Salt Lake for the first time at about 
6:30 P.M. (R. 107) Sometime later on the same 
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evening Robinson again observed Benally in a drunk-
en condition. Benally was immediately placed under 
arrest. At the time of the arrest, Benally had blood 
on his face and his coat was on upside down. Ben-
ally was placed in the paddy wagon and taken to 
the City jail. Robinson helped Benally out of the 
wagon because he felt that for a man in Benally's 
condition it would be dangerous to let him try and 
get out of the wagon himself. ( R. 112) Robinson 
got behind the decedent and took him up the steps 
to the entrance of the jail. (See Exhibit 1.) While 
standing there pushing the door bell to be admitted 
by the jailer, Benally lurched backward and both 
Rdbinson and Benally fell com·pletely to the ground 
with Benally landing on top of Robinson. Robinson 
then got up and again took Benally up the stairs, 
the door was opened and they entered the reception 
room. From there Rdbinson and Benally were ·ad-
mitted to the ''booking area'' of the jail. 
Robinson proceeded to search Benally and give 
his belongings to the jailer. There was no p·articular 
difficulty with this until Robinson a:ttempted to 
reach in the watch pocket of Benally for the purpose 
of removing its contents. Benally seemed to object 
to this part of the searching procedure. As a result, 
Robinson took Benally's hands in his and placed 
them on the wire screen on the west side of the book-
ing area and by using his body he puslhed Ben'ally 
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against the wire screen and held him in that posi-
tion. W'hen he again attempted to get the contents 
of 'tne watch pocket, Benally dropped to the floor 
on his hands and knees and attempted to get hold 
of Ro1binson's leg. Robinson then swung his left leg 
over Benally and stood astraddle of him. He was 
then able to remove the '$10.00 bill from Benally's 
watch pocket. (R. 156-157) As to what occurred 
from here on, the evidence is in conflict. Robinson 
testified that he released Benally after removing 
the $10.00 ~bill. That he watched Benally out of the 
corner of his eye. As Benally got to his feet he start-
ed moving backwards very fast in a northeasterly 
direction until he hit the wire mesh door tha:t was 
hooked open, and this seemed to propel him to the 
left ·down the stairs where ·Benally went head over 
heels and landed on the cement floor on his back. 
(R. 161-163) 
An inmate and a jail trusty, James Day, testi-
fied that Robinson had a stick in his hand that was 
approximately 1 foot long and 3J.t of an inch in di-
ameter and that while he was astraddle Benally 
that he had Benally's head between 'his legs and 
hit him on the head two or three times with the 
stick. That Benally tried to pull away from Robin-
son and in so doing did get free and that he backed 
across the booking area into the wire door that was 
open at the head of the stairs and 'this seemed to 
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turn him to the left and he fell down the stairs. 
James Day also testified that prior to the time that 
Benally fell down the stairs he heard Edmunds, 
the Chief Jailer, say to Robinson that he wasn't 
going to accept anybody that was beat up. Day 
testified that RolJinson made no answer to this 
remark. ( R. 305-311) 
Another inmate, Thomas L. Casteel, testified 
that approximately thirty minutes prior to the time 
Benally was brought in the jail, that he had been 
booked on a charge of being a federal probation 
violator. Casteel and Day were inside the cell block 
door and Benally and Robinson were in the booking 
area. (See Exhibit 6.) There is an opening in the 
cell block door that is about 12" x 15". It has no 
glass in it but does have some ba~s across it. Casteel 
and Day were approximately twenty feet from Rob-
inson and were looking through the window in the 
cell block door. (R. 200-202) Casteel observed that 
Benal'ly was very drunk and that when Robinson 
first 1brought him into the booking area that Robin-
son had a club in his ·hand that was about llj2 inches 
to 2 inches in diameter. That Ben·ally had difficulty 
standing so Robinson laid the clu1b on the counter 
and then used both hands trying to keep Benally up. 
At this point Casteel turned away from the window 
in the cell block door while James Day stood there 
still watching what was going on in the booking 
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area. Casteel then heard Edmunds say, "Robinson, 
if you don/t q1tit be.ating these guys up I am going 
to quit taking them". Following this the only com-
ment m·ade by Robinson was an angry, "God damn 
son-of-a-bitch". (R. 2'30-23'2) About ten to twenty 
seconds later Casteel testified that he heard scuffl-
ing and heard something hit ·a door as if it were 
bouncing against a concrete wall or a brick wall 
·and at that point James Day turned to Casteel and 
said, "Robinson has knocked him down the steps". 
(R. 233) 
Robin·son and another officer who had just 
entered the jail after Benally's fall, brought Ben-
ally upstairs to the booking area. They carried him 
through the cell block door and back into the cell 
block where they, according to Casteel, "Pitched 
him forward onto the floor". (R. 237) Benally 
was left on the floor in an unconscious condition. 
It was not until the late afternoon of the next 
day, Novem'ber 27, 1960, that Benally was taken 
to the Salt Lake County Hospital. He was in the 
hospital from that time until November 30, 1960, 
when he died as a result of the head and brain in-
juries that he received fron1 the fall down the stairs. 
(R. 123-134) 
At the head of the stairway down which Ben-
ally fell, there is a heavy wire mesh door that is 
equipped with a spring designed to keep the door 
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closed at all times except when in actual use for 
ingress or egress. Captain E. J. Steinfeldt, who was 
acting Chief of Police at the time of trial, testified 
tha't in 1956 or 1957 the stairway was changed 
because it was ·dangerous. A number of prisoners 
who were intoxicated had fallen down the stairs 
and for that reason the heavy wire mesh door was 
placed at the head of the stairs with the spring on 
it to keep it closed at all times except when in actual 
use. (R. 185-187) Steinfeldt testified that it was 
common knowledge among the officers on the police 
force that the changes made in the booking area 
and the install'ation of the gate at the head of the 
stairs was for safety reasons. (R. 19'2) He further 
testified that it was the arresting officer's duty 
to keep the prisoner under control at all times dur-
ing the booking and until the prisoner was locke'd 
in his cell. ( R. 196) 
At the time Robinson entered the :booking area 
with Benally the wire door at the head of the stairs 
was open and was held open by a wire hook. All 
Rdbinson would have ha·d to do when he entered the 
booking area was turn 'his eyes to the left and he 
would have observed the door open, but this he 
didn't do. ( R. 183) During his career as a police 
officer, Robinson had booked many a drunk person. 
He knew that the booking area was a small, re-
stricted area. ( R. 180-181) Robinson did not close 
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the door during the booking of Benally nor did he 
close it prior to the time he rele,ased Benally. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RE!FUSING TO 
SUBMIT THE 'CASE TO THE JURY ON THE THEORY 
0'F NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT II 
THE C'OURT ERRED IN XDMITTING, OVER OB-
JECTION, THE TESTIM'ONY 'OF THE DEFENDANT, 
UOUTS W. DUNCAN, THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN 
GIVEN AT THE CORONER''S INQ'UEST. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS 
NO. 21, 22 AND 23. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE T'HEORY 
0'F NEGLIGENCE. 
From the very beginning plaintiffs have assert-
ed liability against the defendants on three differ-
en theories : 
1. That the defendant, L. G. Robinson, will-
fully threw Benally down the stairs. 
2. That the defendant, L. G. Robinson, used 
an unreasonable amount of force in booking Benally 
and this resulted in Benally being propelled down 
the stairs. 
3. That the defendants were negligent in that, 
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a. Clifford G. Edmunds and Louis W. 
Duncan failed to close the door at the head of the 
stairs or take such other precautions as might lbe 
necessary to prevent Benally from injur'ing himself. 
b. L. G. Robinson should have either closed 
the door at the head of the stairs before releasing 
Benally in the booking area or, considering Ben-
ally's condition an·d all of the other circumstances, 
he should have kept Benally under control or taken 
other precautions so as to prevent him from falling 
down the stairs and injuring himself. 
These theories of liability have been asserted 
from the inception of this case. See the complaint 
(R. 1), plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories sub-
mitted by defendant, Louis W. Duncan (R. 15), 
plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories su·bmitted by 
defendant, Clifford G. Edmunds ( R. 17), conten-
tions of plaintiffs served on all parties prior to the 
pretrial (R. 21), plaintiffs' requested Instruction 
No. 7 ( R. 35), plaintiffs' exceptions to instructions 
as given by the court (R. 418-419) and the mem-
orandum of authorities presented to the court prior 
to trial. 
The court by its Instructions 20, 21, 22, 23 and 
24 submitted the case to the jury on the theory that 
the defendant, Robinson, was liable only if Ben-
ally's fall down the stairs was caused by Robinson 
deliberately throwing him down the stairs or by 
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Robinson using excessive and unreasonable force. 
Judge Faux I·efused to instruct the jury that Rob-
inson would be liable if he was guilty of only negli-
gen·ce that caused Benally's fall and resulting death. 
('See plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 7 (R. 35) 
and the court's notation thereon "not given" and 
requested Instruction No. 1 ( R. 38) and the court's 
notation thereon ''given in substance, element of 
negligence omitted".) Judge Van Cott by granting 
the motion for summary judgment of Edmunds and 
Duncan in effect held that there could be no liability 
on their part for their negligence in failing to close 
the door at the head of the stairs or in failing to 
take other precautions to prevent the decedent from 
injuring himself. 
The fundamental issue involved in this appeal 
is whether or not a police officer is liable for injury 
or death of a prisoner that is proximately caused by 
the police officer's negligence or is a police officer 
liable only for injury or death of a prisoner if it 
results from a willful wrongful act of the officer 
or from the use of unreasonable and excessiYe force. 
It 'is plain tiffs' position that a police officer is liable 
for negligence that results in injury or death to a 
prisoner. And this is true whether the negligence 
be called a "misfeasance" or a "nonfeasance". 
Exhibit 6 is a diagram of the City Jail. Ex-
hibit 1 is a photograph showing the steps and the 
10 
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entrance to the jail. Exhibit 3 is a photograph that 
is taken just inside the front door of the jail and 
shows the wire mesh wall and door that leads into 
the booking area. This photograph also shows the 
wire door that is at the head of the stairs in ques-
tion. It should 1be noted that the diagram of the jail, 
Exhibit 6, shows a heavy dark wall between the 
l'eception room and the booking area. From looking 
at that exhibit it might be thought that the wall is 
a solid wall. \This is not true. The wall is a wire 
mesh wall and a wire mesh door 'as is shown by 
Exhibit 3. It should be noted that the distance from 
the door at the head of the stairs to the wire wall 
that separates the reception room from the hea·d of 
the stairs is 3' 10". The distance from the west side 
of the stairs to the booking window is only 3' 21j2". 
The overall distance from the east side of the stairs 
to the other side or west side of the booking area is 
only 6' 8". The booking area as will 'be seen from 
the diagram, Exhibit 6, is small and restricted. This 
fact Rdbinson well knew and admitted knowing. 
(R. 180) All of the defendants as did all of the other 
officers on the force knew that the door was placed 
at the head of the stairs for safety reasons because 
several persons particularly those who were intoxi-
cated had fallen down the stairs. Captain E. J. 
Steinfeldt, the officer in charge of the jail, testi-
11 
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fied that the door was installed in 1956 or 19'57. In 
addition, he testified as follows at p. 185: 
"Q. It was during that year then that 
you say that you put this heavy wire door at 
the head of the stairs, the stairs that Ben-
ally went down? 
"A. Correct. 
"Q. And you put it up there for what 
reason? 
"A. A safety measure. 
"Q. And why did you feel that it should 
be there for safety purposes? 
"A. Well ordinarily an individual just 
not knowing the stairway was there would fall 
down it.'' 
Captain Steinfeldt testified that prior to the 
installation of this door, a number of people, par-
ticularly those who were intoxicated, had fallen 
down the stairs and that this was the reason for 
the change. (R. 187) Steinfeldt further testified 
on p. 1H2, 
"Q. Now Chief one more question here. 
When you made all of these changes in the 
booking area and put this gate in at the head 
of the stairs, was this pretty much co1nmon 
knowledge among the officers on the force at 
that time? 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. And in particular to those who 
would have been using the jail? 
''A. Yes. 
12 
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"Q. And was it pretty much common 
knowledge among your officers as to why 
you were doing it? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And that common knowledge was 
that it was for safety purposes? 
A. Correct.'' 
At the time of the accident the d'efendant, 
Edmunds, was the senior officer and was in charge 
of the jail. ( R. 192) 
An arresting officer is responsible for his pris-
oner during the booking and until the prisoner is 
placed in his cell. ( R. 190) If the arresting officer 
needs help with the prisoner, he should request as-
sistance from the jailer. (R. 190) Robinson had no 
difficulty handling Benally and he at no time re-
quested Edmunds or Duncan to assist him. (R. 159-
160) Robinson knew Benally was drunk. At p. 17 0 
the following question was asked and answer was 
given. 
"Q. (By Mr. Crellin) You testified 
that by a classification of drunk, slightly 
drunk or very drunk that you would classify 
Mr. Benally as having been very drunk is that 
correct? 
''A. Correct.'' 
At p. 122 the following questions were asked 
and answers given. 
''Q. Now when you got out of the wagon 
13 
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at the police station, what did you do then, 
Mr. Robinson? 
"A. Helped him from the wagon over 
to the steps and up the steps. 
"Q. Now you say you helped him out 
of the wagon? 
''A. I did. 
"Q. And what was the reason for help-
ing him out? 
"A. Well there is quite a step from the 
wagon down to the ground and a man in his 
condition would be dangerous to let him make 
the step by himself. 
"Q. And how far would this step be, I 
mean in feet from the getting out of the wagon 
down to the ground? 
A. I'd say possibly two feet." 
Robinson knew that Benally had lurched against 
him when they were about to enter the jail and had 
caused both of them to fall to the ground. In again 
classifying his condition Robinson said he was to 
a staggering and mumbling point but still mobile. 
(R. 171) Robinson knew he had difficulty with 
Benally after he got in the booking area in search-
ing him. When Benally was arrested his jacket was 
on upside down and he had 'blood on his face. (R. 
109) 
All of the defendants knew or should have 
known that the door at the head of the stairs was 
open. They all knew that it was placed there for 
14 
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safety reasons, that the booking area was small 
and restricted and that there was a great likelihood 
that if a person in an intoxicated condition was in 
the booking area th'at that person, if the door was 
open, would fall down the stairs. 
Certainly Duncan and Edmunds knew or s·hould 
have known that with the door that had ~been placed 
there for safety purposes, open, a d~a.ngerous condi-
tion existed and in particular a dangerous situa-
tion existed for a prisoner who was intoxicated. 
Assuming that Robinson had no duty at all with 
respect to the closing of the door inasmuch as Ed-
munds and Duncan, being the jailers, were in charge 
of the jail, prior to the time that Robinson released 
Benally, still it must \be kept in mind that Ro1binson 
knew the door was there, knew why it was there, 
knew the condition of Benally and if he was not 
required prior to releasing Benally, to affirmatively 
shut the door, certainly he should be required before 
he released Benally to either shut the door or if he 
did not do th'at he should keep Benally under such 
control that Benally in his then condition could not 
fall down the stairs and injure himself. 
As seen from the foregoing there is ample evi-
dence fron1 which a jury could find that Duncan 
and Edmunds were negligent for leaving the door 
at the head of the stairs open and th~at Robinson 
was negligent when he released Benally in the book-
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irig area without first closing the door or taking 
other pi~ec[tutions to prevent Benally from falling 
down the stairs. The question is whether under the 
law of this state a police officer is liable for injury 
or death of a prisoner that results from the police 
officer's negligence as distinguished from his will-
ful or intentional wrongful acts or his excessive 
use of force. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Lowry 
v. C~arbon County, et al, 64 U. 555, 232 P. 908 
( 1924), has held that a public official in the per-
form~ance of his duty is liable for injury or death of 
another caused by the negligent acts of the public 
official. In th'at case the county commissioners were 
personally engaged in building a road through 
Helper. They carelessly set a charge of dynamite 
to blast some rock. This rock hit the decedent and 
resulted in his death. The court in the Lowry case 
cites the Massachusetts case of Moynihan v. Todd, 
188 M~ass. 301, 74 N.E. 367, and by dicta seems 
to adopt the rule that public officials are liable for 
a misfeasance but are not li~able for a nonfeasance. 
Again it should be observed that this is only dicta. 
The narrow holding of the Lowry case is that a 
pu'blic official is liable for his negligent acts. 
In the first place there can be no merit to the 
distinction between a nonfeasance and ·a misfeas-
ance. If there is a duty to act and a failure that 
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results in injury or death, the resulting damage is 
the sa1ne whether the harm resulted from a negli-
gent act or a failure to act in the face of a duty to 
act. We respectfully urge this court to ignore the 
dicta in the Lowry case and to adopt a rule predic-
ating lia'bility on the theory of negligence whether 
the negligence be a so called "misfeasance" or a 
"nonfeasance". Many states have adopted such a 
rule and have made no distinction in determining 
the liability of a police officer for injury or death 
of a prisoner. 
Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E. 2d 150, 
involved a case where the plaintiff's son suffered 
from a nervous breakdown making him oblivious to 
danger. The sheriff ·arrested the boy and put him 
'in jail. The p'arents notified the sheriff of the boy's 
condition and requested the sheriff to keep him in 
in a place of safety. The sheriff permitted the boy 
to roam in an upstairs hallway of the jail where 
there was an open space into which he fell to his 
death. The sheriff in this case failed to take measures 
to keep the boy in a safe place. The court held the 
sheriff was liable for such failure. 
The case of Justice v. Rose, 102 Ohio App. 482, 
144 N.E. 2d 303, adopts the majority rule that a 
sheriff or other officer must exercise reasonable 
and ordinary care to insure the preservation of life 
and the health of a prisoner. The court observes 
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that the statute imposingJ a duty on the sheriff_ to 
keep priisoners safely is_ merely declaratory of the 
common law which imposes that duty on the sheriff 
and requires him to exercise reasonable care and 
diligence to protect a prisoner from :a danger that 
is known to him or which might be reasonably anti~ 
cipated by him. The court says liability of the sheriff 
is predicated on negligence. 
Smith v. Miller, 241 Ia. 625, 40 N.W. 2d 597, 
14 A.L.R. 2d 345 ( 1950), involved an action to 
recover damages for wrongful death of a prisoner 
that died in the county jail. He was the only prison-
er. No guards were kept in the jail. He was visited 
by officers only at times necesS'ary to feed him. He 
had no means of communication with the people 
outside except by shouting. No one in the imme-
diate vicinity of the jail had a key or means of 
evacuating prisoners in ·an emergency. The decedent 
died from suffocation when the jail filled with smoke 
from a burning mattress, which was presumably 
ignited ·by a cigarette. The lower court entered a 
judgment for the defendant and the Supreme Court 
reversed. The court in reversing quoted from Odell 
v. Goodsell, 149 Neb. 261, 30 N.W. 2d 906,. where 
the prisoner suffocated in th·e jail by a burning mat-
tress ·and the Supreme Court of Nebraska held it 
was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for 
the sheriff. The N elbraska court said, 
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• · \\r e think it was error for the trial court 
to refuse to submit to a jury the failure of the 
sheriff to provide a guard for the jail in its 
described condition and the proper inferences 
to be drawn from such failure. We also think 
it was error for the court to refuse to submit 
to a jury the question of the adequacy of ven-
tilation under the circumstances and the fail-
ure to make outside communication available 
and the proper inferences to be drawn from 
the circumstances. 
'·'We think that the question of whether 
the sheriff under the circumstances failed to 
respond to his duty to the plaintiff's decedent 
in light of the potential d'anger of which he 
knew or in the ordinary exercise of his faci-
lities for observation and understanding 
should have known, was a question for deter-
mination by a jury.'' 
Clark v. Kelly, 101 W. Va. 650, 133 S.E. 365, 
46 A.L.R. 799, involved an ·action against the sheriff 
for damages for injury when ·a jail flooded. In hold-
ing that the sheriff was liable for failure to take 
precautions to prevent the flooding of the jail the 
court said, 
"We will not undertake to review all the 
decisions cited by counsel for the proposition 
many times affirmed, that a public officer is 
liable to anyone injured by the nonperform-
ance or negligent perform,ance of ·his minis-
terial duties, and this without regard to his 
motives and without reference to any question 
of corruption; and whether he has discharged 
these imposed duties is generally a question 
of fact for the jury." 
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The annotation in 14 A.L.R. 2d 345 entitled 
"Civil Liability of Sheriff or Other Officer Charged 
with Keeping Jail or a Prison for Death or Injury 
of Prisoner", states the rule as follows, 
"The majority of courts hold that the 
sheriff or other officer, owes a duty to the 
prisoner to keep him safely and to protect 
him from unnecessary harm and· it has also 
been held that the officer must exercise 
reasonable and ordin·ary care for the life and 
health of the prisoner." 
In support of this rule our own case of Richardson 
v. Capwell, 63 U. 616, 176 P. 205, is cited. The Utah 
case involved an action against the town marshal 
and the justice of the peace. Insofar as it affected 
the town marshal, the plaintiff claimed damages on 
the ground that during the time that he was in 
prison he was given insufficiei1t nourishment, was 
exposed to the ·cold and was put in an unsanitary 
and filthy jail. The trial court failed to give any 
instructions to the effect that the plai11tiff could 
recover damages resulting from the failure to nlain-
tain the jail in proper condition. The Utah Supreme 
Court reversed as to this phase of the case and in 
so doing said, 
* * * ''It does appear that the defendant, 
Jenkins, a~ ~own marsh·al was the keeper of 
the town Jail and was supposed to furnish 
food for the prisoners as well as to keep the 
b~ilding ~arm. and sanitary. If plaintiff de-
sires, he Is entitled to have the question as to 
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damages, if any, he m·ay have sustained- in 
these particulars, submitted to the jury; * * *" 
The annotation in 60 A.L.R. 2d 873 entitled 
"Personal Liability of Policeman, Sheriff or Other 
Peace Officer or Bond for Negligently Causing Per-
sonal Injury or Death" cites the general rule to the 
effect that a peace officer, as a general rule, is per-
sonally liable for negligent or wrongful acts caus-
ing personal injury or death. The annotation then 
defines negligence as follows: 
"Negligent conduct may be either (a) 
an act which the actor as a reasonable man 
should realize as involving an unreasonable 
risk or causing an invasion of an interest of 
another, or (b) a failure to do an act which 
is necessary for the protection or assistance 
of another and which the actor is under a 
duty to do." 
In 80 C.J.S., Sec. 117, p. 3'26, the rule is stated, 
"A sheriff owes a duty to ·a prisoner in 
his custody to keep him in health and free 
from harm. He must exercise ordinary and 
reasonable care under the circumstances to 
preserve the life, health and safety of a pris-
oner in his care and custody, * * *" 
In 72 C.J.S., Sec. 13, p. 866, the rule is stated, 
"A jail official has a duty to use reason-
able care to prevent injuries to a prisoner by 
his fellow prisoners." 
Hunt Y. Rowton, 143 Okla. 181, 288 P. 342, 
involved a suit against a sheriff for negligence in 
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the sheriff failing to isolate a prisoner that was 
suffering from sm'all pox from the rest of the 
prisoners. The deceased contacted the disease and 
died. The court held the sheriff was liable and af-
firmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the 
ground that the sheriff was negligent in failing to 
isolate the prisoner who was infected with a con-
tagious dise~ase. 
We ~submit that no distinction should be made 
between a misfeasance and a nonfeasance, and that 
the Utah Court should ignore the dicta in the Lowry 
case and predicate li'ability of a police officer on 
the theory of negligence whether the negligence be 
for action or nonaction. In the event such a dis-
tinction is made it is our position that as to the de-
fendant, Ro'binson, his negligence is definitely a 
misfeasance. He has control of the decedent and 
he affirmatively rele'ases the decedent in a place of 
danger knowing that the decedent is likely to in-
jure himself by reason of his intoxicated condition 
and by reason of the fact that the door at the ·head 
of the stairs is open. Even under the rule announced 
by the Lowry case, Robinson's negligent act of re-
leasing the decedent in a place of danger would be 
sufficient on which to predicate liability. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas in Bukaty v. 
Berglund, 179 Ka. 259, 294 P. 2d 2'28 ( 1956), re-
versed the lower court's dismissal of an action 
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against a sheriff that was grounded on the theory 
that to recover from a police officer there had to be 
a showing of willfulness or malice or bad faith. 'The 
Supreme Court after reviewing a number o'f cases 
rejected that rule and held that a sheriff or other 
person h'aving another in custody is lialble for in-
juries or death caused by his negligen,ce. 
The defendants in this case will undoubtedly 
cite Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 U. 520, 57 P. 2d 1128, for 
the proposition that a police officer is not liable 
unless a showing of malice or bad faith on the part 
of an officer is shown. The Roe case is definitely 
not authority for this proposition lbut merely holds 
that an officer who commits a trespass in the en-
forcement of an invalid ordinance is civilly liable 
for that trespass. The statements in the case that 
indicate that "willful negligence, malice, or corrup-
tion constituting misfeasance" are necessary before 
an officer is liable, are dicta and we again urge this 
court to ignore the dicta of the Roe case and Lowry 
case and ~announce a rule that is in accord with the 
later 'decisions of other states that have dealt with 
the problem; namely, that a peace officer is liable 
for injury or death that result from his negligence 
and that is true whether the negligence be a mis-
feasance or a nonfeasance. 
Thomas v. Williams, 124 S.E. 21d 409, (Ga. 
1962), was an action to recover dam,ages for a 
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wrongful de~ath. In that case the chief of police 
arrested the decedent for drunk driving and dis-
orderly conduct and put him in a cell in a partially 
unconscious and helpless condition. The decedent had 
matches and a lighted cigarette in his possession. 
Defen1d·ant thereafter left the j~ail without leaving 
anyone in attendance and defendant failed to take 
the m~atches and lighted cigarette from decedent. 
While defendant was gone a m~attress caught fire 
in the cell and the decedent suffocated. The officer 
returned while the mattress was burning and in-
stead of immediately getting the decedent out of 
the cell, he got a hose and turned the water on the 
mattress which the plaintiff claims increased the 
smoke and the danger to the prisoner. 
The trial court dismissed the complaint and 
on appeal the appellate court reversed and in so do-
ing announced the general rule that an officer h·av-
ing custody of a prisoner, has a duty to exercise 
ordinary care to keep his prisoner safe and free 
from harm. The court then discusses the affect of 
the prisoner being drunk and i11 so doing says, 
"The law is that a person is charged with 
knowledge that a man staggering drunk is 
incapable of exercising ordinary care for his 
own safety, and he is bou11d to deal with him 
with th~at fact in mind. Bennett Drug Stores 
v. Moseley, 6·7 Ga. App. 347, 20 S.E. 2d 208. 
The present petition alleges that the officer 
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had knowledge of the prisoner's helpless con-
dition. If this be true, the officer in perform~ 
ing his duty to exercise ordinary diligence to 
keep the prisoner safe and free from harm, 
was bound to deal with him with his condition 
in min·d.'' 
"In the performance of his· duty to exer-
cise ordinary diligence to keep h~s prisoner 
safe and free from harm, ~an officer having 
custody of a prisoner, when he has knowledge 
of facts from which it might be concluded that 
the prisoner may harm himself or others un-
less preclusive measures are taken, must use 
reasonable care to prevent such harm. In some 
circumstances reasonable care may require 
the officer to act affirmatively to fulfill this 
duty." 
The court then goes on to s~ay, 
HThe present petition presents these 
questions which must be decided by the jury: 
"Was the officer negligent in leaving the 
prisoner incarcerated in a close cell anld un-
attended, with a lighted cigarette and matc·hes 
on his person, when he knew the prisoner 
was partially unconscious and helpless? 
Q'Should the officer, under the circum-
stances, in the exercise of his duty to keep the 
prisoner safe and free from harm, h~ave im-
mediately rescued the prisoner upon becom-
ing aware of the fire in the cell? 
"Was the officer negligent in pumping 
water on the burning mattress in the prison-
er's cell, in that he should, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, have anticipated th~at this 
would increase the danger of the prisoner?" 
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Muniz v. United States, Docket No. 26841, 2nd 
Cir. N.Y. decided February 27, 1962. (The case is 
not reported at this time.) This case involved a suit 
by a Federal prisoner who was allegedly beaten into 
insensibility and partiallJlinidness 'by fellow inmates. 
The court held that a cause of action was stated 
alleging negligence in supervision of the prisoners 
that resulted in injury to the plaintiff. 
The court in this case held 'that the exception 
barring claims "arising out of assault" did not apply 
in this case. The exception applies only to assault 
by government agents, not to assaults by third per-
sons which the government negligently fails to pre-
vent. (Emphasis ours) 
App1ying the rules of the foregoing cases to 
the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that all 
of the defendants were negligent. All of the defend-
ants knew the door at the head of the stairs was 
placed there for safety purposes, that prisoners and 
particularly intoxicated ones had fallen 'down the 
stairs prior to the installation of the wire door, that 
the door was equipped with a spring to keep it shut 
unless it was affirmatively opened and hooked to 
the wall, that Benally was in a "very drunk" con-
dition, that he was uncooperative during the book-
ing procedure, that the 'booking area was small, re-
stricted and 'a dangerous place wh,en the door was 
open. Rdbinson knew that the decedent ~had blood 
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on his face and his coat was upside down at the 
time of the arrest, that he was very drunk and that 
he was incapable of getting out of the patrol wagon 
alone without danger to himself, that he lurched 
outside the jail causing 'both himself and Robinson 
to fall to the ground, that he was very uncooperative 
during the search procedure. Under these circum-
stances it is difficult to see what other conclusion 
could be drawn than Edmunds and Duncan should 
have anticipated that a person in Benally's condi-
tion could very well injure him~self by falling down 
the stairs unless they closed the door at the head 
of the stairs or unless they took other precautions 
to prevent Benally from injuring himself. As far 
as Robinson is concerned knowing the condition of 
the booking area, the condition of IBenally and know-
ing the reason for putting the door at the head of 
the stairs, it is inconceivable that Robinson would 
release Benally in the booking area, a place of 
danger, without either first closing the door at the 
head of the stairs or taking other precautions to 
see that Benally did not injure himself by falling 
down the stairs. 
This court is again urged to disregard com-
pletely the dicta statement of the Lowry and Roe 
cases and to clearly declare the rule of this state 
to be that an officer is liable for a failure to exer-
cise ordinary care when that results in injury or 
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death to a prisoner and that this is so whether the 
failure to exercise ordinary care is a misfeasance 
or a nonfeasance. A life or a lim'b is as effectively 
gone w·hether caused by negligent action or negli-
gent inaction. In reason the distinction between a 
so called misfeasance and a so called nonfeasance 
cannot be sustained. 
POINT II 
THE C·OURT ERRED IN ADMITTING, OVER OB-
JE·CTION, THE TESTIMONY O·F THE DEFEN'DANT, 
LO'UI1S W. DUNCAN, THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN 
GIVEN AT THE CORONER'S INQUEST. 
On Decem·ber 6, 1960, there was ·a coroner's 
jnquest held in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the death 
of Thomas Dee Benally. Louis W. Duncan, among 
other witnesses, was called and testified. 
The day before the inquest plaintiffs' present 
counsel was called 'by a representative of the Navajo 
Tribe and was requested to attend the inquest and 
report to the Tribe the results. ( R. 3'71) Without 
time to prepare and without knowing anything about 
the detai·ls of the case, the writer did appear at the 
inquest representing the Navajo Tribe and 11ot the 
plaintiffs. The writer did question several of the 
witnesses incltlding· the defenda11t, Louis \V. Duncan. 
A few days prior to the trial of this case the 
defendant, Duncan, was injured and at the time of 
the trial was confined in ·a hospital and was unable 
to attend and testify. 
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At the inquest Thomas L. Casteel and James 
Day testified that prior to the time that Benally 
fell down the stairs they heard Edmunds say, 
"Ro·bby if you don't quit beating up these 
guys I am going to quit taking them". 
At the inquest Officer Duncan when asked about 
this statement of Edmunds said, that he did not 
hear such a statement and about all he dfd hear 
was Edmunds say something albout he could not or 
would not take an injured prisoner and that this 
statement was made after Benally had fallen down 
the stairs. 
After the coroner's inquest the special inves-
tigator employed by the City Commission, Mr. Ar-
thur A. Allen, Jr., ·and a Mr. Gregory, a polygraph 
operator from Chicago, interviewed several of the 
officers involved including Officer Duncan. Mr. 
Gregory's report filed with the City Commission 
in referring to the interview with Officer Duncan 
states, 
"He said he is not positive, ~but is quite 
sure he recalls Edmunds saying lo Robinson, 
if you don't stop beating these guys up I am 
not going to take them, and that this was said 
while Benally was still on the floor." 
This statement was inconsistenl with the testi-
mony that Duncan had given at the coroner's in-
quest. It was plaintiffs' position at the trial of this 
case that Duncan's testimony given at the coroner's 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inquest was not admissible and particularly is that 
true because pllaintiffs would not be entitled to 
cross-examine Duncan relative to the later inconsis-
tent statement that he made to the polygraph oper-
ator. 
It is plaintiffs' position that although plaintiffs' 
attorney, Glenn C. Hanni, was present at the in-
quest and did in fact question Mr. Duncan, that he 
was not representing plaintiffs, th~at plaintiffs were 
not parties to the inquest and further that the in-
quest is not a judicial proceeding but is an inquisi-
torial proceeding for the sole purpose of determin-
ing whether or not any violation of the criminal 
laws has occurred an·d therefore since plaintiffs 
were not parties at the inquest ·and since the issues 
at the inquest are substantially different than the 
issues at the trial of this case, the testimony of 
Duncan should not have been admitted. 
In 31 C.J.S., Sec. 385, p. 1191, the rule is stated, 
"Evidence given at a coroner's inquest 
is inadmissible except that such evidence has 
been held competent in some proceedings of a 
special nature, such as hearings before an in-
dustrial accident commission." 
In Pittsburgh Rail?,.oad Company v. McGrath, 
3 N.E. 439 (Ill. 1885) the court ·held that the testi-
mony of a witness to a railroad accident, resulting 
in the death of a person injure;d, taken before a 
coroner's inquest upon the body of the deceased, 
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which witness had since died is inadmissible in an 
action by the representative by the deceased person 
against the railway comp'any for the injury result-
ing in such death. 
Bragdon v. Northwestern R~ailroad Company, 
141 S.C. 238, 139 S.E. 459, involved an action to 
recover dan1ages for a wrongful death. The appel-
late court in sustaining the exclusion of testimony 
received 'at a coroner's inquest said, 
"At the trial the defendant attempted to 
offer in evidence the testimony of Albert Wil-
son, the driver of the automobile, given at the 
coroner's inquisition over the dead body of 
Jemina Walker. The trial judge held this testi-
mony incompetent and in this holding he was 
absolutely correc't. If Wilson had been offered 
as a witness by the plaintiff, he could have 
been cross-examined 'as to this testimony be-
fore the coroner, and had 'he contradicted the 
statements there made by him, the defendant 
could have then offered his former testimony. 
We know of no rule, however, which would 
have permitted the defendant to introduce this 
statemen't as original testimony on its part." 
Ches,apeake (\; Ohio R,ailroad Company v. Mc-
Don.ald, 239 Ky. 258, 39 S.W. 2d 253 (1931). This 
was an action to recover damages for a wrongful 
death. The court in this case held that the testimony 
of a witness given at a coroner's inquest was not 
admissible and the Supreme Cour't on appeal af-
firmed. In so doing the court said, 
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"It is insisted that the court erred in 
refusing to allow the engineer's testimony, 
given before the coroner to be read before 
the jury. In Kelly v. Connell, 3 Dana 532, evi-
dence given before arbitrators was held ad-
missible ·(where the witness is dead) in a 
subsequent suit between the same parties. So 
in 0' Brien v. Com, 6 Bush 563, the evidence 
of a witness on the examining trial was held 
competent on the fin'al trial of the case where 
the witness was dead. In North River Insur-
ance Company v. Walker, 161 Ky. 368, 170 
S.W. 983, the testimony of a dead witness, 
upon the examining trial of the assured, was 
held competent in his suit against the insur-
ance company. But none of these cases in-
volved the competency of the testimony of a 
witness on a coroner's inquest. A coroner is 
not 'a judicial officer. The proceeding is in-
quisitorial. The examination and cross-ex-
amination of witnesses are m·atters of grace 
and not of right. The plaintiff was not a party 
to that proceeding. In Jones on Evidence, Sec. 
339, the rule is thus stated: Nor is the testi-
mony of a witness given ·at a coroner's inquest 
admissible under this exception in a subse-
quent action, as the inquest is not ·a judicial 
proceeding belween the same parties." 
Edgerly v. Appleyard, 110 Me. 337, 86 A. 244 
( 1913). The court in affirming the exclusion of the 
testimony of a witness given at a coroner's inquest 
said, 
"The single question argued and present-
ed in this case is whether the testimony of a 
witness given at a coroner's inquest upon the 
death of the plaintiffs intestate was admis-
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sible in this action, when offered by the plain-
tiff, the witness having deceased after the in-
quest and before the trial. The trial court held 
it was inadmissible ·and the Supreme Court 
affirmed. 
''~These proceedings are designed pri-
Inarily to aid in the detection of crime. The 
inquest is ordinarily held immediately after 
the event has happened, and often times be-
fore the perpetrator is known or ever suspect-
ed. IThey are initiated by a public officer, 
there is no party defendant, and the county 
attorney, as the public prosecutor, usually 
elicits the evidence." 
The court cleary committed prejudicial error 
in admitting, over objection, the testimony of Dun-
can given at the coroner's inquest. That is particu-
larly true in view of the later sta'tement made by 
Duncan to the polygraph operator that was incon-
sistent with his testimony at the coroner's inquest 
and concerning which plaintiffs were completely 
deprived of their right of cross-examination. 
It may be argued that because plaintiffs' at-
torney was present at the inquest and did question 
Duncan th·at the testimony of Duncan should be ad-
missible. This argument ignores several things; ( 1) 
plaintiffs' attorney was representing the ·Tribe only 
at the inquest; ( 2) plaintiffs were not p·arties to 
the inquest; ( 3) the inquest was not a judicial pro-
ceeding but is merely an inquisition ; ( 4) the right 
of one other than the County Attorney to examine 
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witnesses is a matter of grace and not of right and 
this necessarily inhibits an attorney from cross-
examining a witness to the extent he might if in-
volved in a proceeding where his client was a party, 
where his client's substantial rights were involved 
an·d where he was examining as of right ~and not 
by grace ; ( 5) the issues were not the same; ( 6) 
plaintiffs' attorney attended the inquest after be-
ing requested to do so only the day before and with-
out a reason to prepare or adequate time to prep'are 
or become acquainted with the facts. To hold that 
this afforded plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to 
cross-examine would be tantamount to holding that 
a person charged with crime was afforded counsel 
and a fair trial if his attorney was appointed only 
the day before the trial commenced and without time 
to prep~are. 
Plaintiffs were seriously prejudiced by per-
mitting the use of Duncan's inquest testimony and 
for this reason the judgment as to Robinson should 
be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS 
NO. 21, 22 AND 23. 
Instruction No. 22 reads as follows, 
"You are instructed that if you find, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
plaintiffs' deceased husband and father fell 
down the stairs in the City Jail as a conse-
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quence of his own voluntary acts an.d his in-
toxicated condition and that said fall proxi-
mately cau·sed the injury or injuries which 
resulted in his death, you may not determine 
that said death was due to any bre'ach uf duty 
by defendant, Robinson." 
In dealing with a claim of the defendant that 
because the deceased was voluntarily drunk there 
should be no liability for his de'ath the court in 
Thomas v. Williams, 124 S.E. 2d 409, (Ga. 1962) 
said, 
"The prisoner may have been drunk vol-
untarily, but he 'vas not in the cell voluntarily. 
The prisoner was not in the class of a tres-
passer at the place where he was injured. 
''T'he law is that a person is charged with 
knowledge that a' man staggering drunk is 
incapable of exercising ordinary care for his 
own safety, 'and he is bot1nd to deal with him 
with that fact in mind. Bennett Drug Stores v. 
Moseley, 67 Ga. App. 347, 20 S.E. 2d. 208. 
The present petition alleges that the officer 
had knowledge of the prisoner's helpless con-
dition. If 'this be true, the officer in perform-
ing his duty to exercise ordinary diligence to 
keep the prisoner safe and free from harm, 
was bound to deal with him with his condi-
tion in mind." 
Since an officer's duty is to exercise reason-
able care to keep his prisoner safe and free from 
harm, the above instruction is clearly erroneous be-
cause the fact that Benally was "very drunk" and 
unable to take care of himself, was a circumstance 
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of which the defendants were well aware, and was 
a circumstance that the jury was entitled to con-
sider in determining whether or not Robinson exer-
cised that degree of care that an ordinary person 
would have exercised under the same or similar 
circumstances. 
The court also instructed the jury in Instruc-
tion No. 23 as follows, 
"You are instructed that the defendant 
was under no duty to maintain the jail in a 
safe condition. Therefore, if you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the fatal 
injuries suffered by Thomas Dee Benally re-
sulted from a fall down the stairs in the City 
Jail on the evening of November 26, 1960, 
and that said fall was proximately caused 
by reason of the fact that the door at the head 
of the jail had been left open by those in 
charge of the jail, you may not determine that 
said death was due to any breach of duty by 
defendant Robinson." 
In the first place this instruction amounts to 
a comment on the evidence. It in effect tells the 
jury that the fact that the jail door 'vas open is some-
thing that the jury may not take into account at all 
in determining whether Robinson breached any duty. 
Inasmuch as Robinson knew that Ben'ally was in-
toxicated and unable to care for himself and knew 
that the booking area was a place of danger and 
knew that the door at the head of the s'tairs had 
been put there for safety reasons and that other 
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prisoners in an intoxicated condition prior to that 
time had fallen down the same stairs, the fact that 
the door was left open was ~a circumstance that the 
jury was entitled to consider in determining w'hether 
or not Robinson failed to exercise ordinary care to 
prevent Benally from injuring himself. The instruc-
tion also would lead the jury to believe 'that if the 
fact that the door was open had anything at all to 
do with Ben'ally's death, that the jury should then 
find that Robinson had done no wrong. 
In effect this instruction is similar to the one 
involved in Hooper v. Genenal Motors Corp., 123 U . 
. 515, 2·60 P. 2d 549, where the jury was instructed 
that the fact that the rim and spider were found 
in a separated condition after the accident is no 
evidence of the fact that they were defective at the 
time of manufacture nor of the fact that the separ-
ating cause·d the truck to overturn. The Supreme 
Court reversed holding that the fact the spider and 
rim were sep·arated was some evidence bearing on 
defect and on causation. So in the case at bar the 
instruction as given in effect removes completely 
from the jury's consideration the fact that the door 
was open as having any bearing on Ro'binson's negli-
gence. This, we think, was error. 
The vice of the instruction lies in this. While 
it may not have been Robinson's duty ordin'arily to 
see that the door was closed since that was the 
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responsibility of the people in charge of the jail, 
it definitely does not follow that Robinson, if he 
elected to release his prisoner, would not then have 
a duty as to the door. As long as Robinson had con-
trol of his prisoner it may be supposed that he did 
not have 'any duty as to the door, but once he is 
about 'to release him, ordinary care requires, know-
ing Benally's condition, that Robinson either shut 
the door before releasing Benally or that he take 
other measures to prevent him from injuring him-
self in this place of danger. 
If the law of this state is what we believe it 
to be, that a police officer is liable for injury or 
death of a prisoner caused by his negligence, then 
clearly this instruction is wrong because the fact 
that the door was open is definitely a circumstance, 
along with all of the other circumstances, that the 
jury is entitled to take into account in determining 
whether or not Robinson, considering the knowledge 
he had of the condition of the j'ail and Benally's 
condition, exercise·d reasonable care for the safety 
of his prisoner. 
The mere fact that Edn1unds and Duncan also 
had a duty to keep the door shut, would not relieve 
Robinson of his duty to exercise reasonable care for 
the safety of the prisoner. 
As the Supreme Court of N evad·a said in Alec 
Novak & Sons v. Hoppin, 359 P. 2d 390 (Nev. 1962), 
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"Before negligence can be actionable, 
that is to say before it can be charged against 
a party to a lawsuit, such negligence must be 
a proximate cause of the damage complained 
of. This does not mean that the law seeks and 
recognizes only one proximate cause of an 
injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, 
one element or circumstance, or the conduct 
of any one person. 'To the contrary, the acts 
and omissions of two or more persons may 
work concurrently as the efficient cause of 
an injury, and in such a case, each of the par-
ticipating acts or omissions is regarded in 
law as a proximate cause.'' 
So in this case it is plaintiffs' position th~t the 
negligence of all three defendants concurred and 
resulted in the death of Benally, and that plaintiffs 
are entitled to have their case submitted to a jury 
with instructions that correctly state the law. 
It should be noted that the trial court used the 
words "wrongful performance of duty" in its in-
structions. Instruction No. 21 (R. 76), consistent 
with what we respectfully urge was the trial court's 
erroneous view of the law, in substance defines 
wrongful performance of duty as an intentional 
use of unnecessary force or the use of force in ex-
cess of that which an ordinary prudent person would 
have used. This instruction is clearly erroneous be-
cause it eliminates from the jury's consideration, 
the predicating of liability on the ground of negli-
gence. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court is urged to clearly ·announce the 
rule that a police officer is liable for the injury or 
de·ath of a prisoner caused by negligence, whether 
that negligence be a misfeasance or ·a nonfeasance. 
Prejudicial error was committed in admitting the 
inquest testimony of Duncan ·and in giving the in-
structions discussed in Point III. 
The judgment in favor of the defendants, Ed-
munds and Duncan, should be reversed and the case 
sent back for trial. The judgment in favor of the 
defendant, Robinson, should ·be reversed and a new 
trial ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLENN C. HANNI 
1229 First Security Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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